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1. Introduction
Lockard and Tullock (2001) have recently edited a volume on ”Eﬃcient Rent-
Seeking”, which documents Tullock’s classic analysis of rent-seeking competition
as a contest and its inﬂuence on the subsequent rent-seeking literature. This
literature by now also forms an important part of general contest theory as many
of its modeling features – like the speciﬁcation of contest success functions – are of
more universal nature. The theory of rent-seeking and contest theory as a whole
are based on Nash equilibrium as a solution concept. Evolutionary equilibrium
– as presented in this paper – is based on the notion of an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS) as a solution concept, which focusses on behavior (and its diﬀusion)
itself rather than on choice of behavior. An ESS is the simplest solution concept
from evolutionary game theory, which has been used to justify rationalistic Nash
equilibrium. However, the popular view that an ESS represents a reﬁnement of
Nash equilibrium is only correct, if one applies the evolutionary argument – often
implicitly, but not explicitly assumed – to an inﬁnite population of players. For
ﬁnite populations, a staple in the rent-seeking and contest literature, an ESS may
diﬀer from Nash equilibrium (Schaﬀer, 1988). It indeed does so in the case of
Tullock contests: we prove existence of an ESS and explore the implications of
these diﬀerences in contest behavior in detail.
This diﬀerence is of interest from a principal point of view: Alchian (1950) argued
in his classic essay on evolutionary economics that the postulate of maximization
(as in Nash equilibrium) may be false but that its use is justiﬁed by the tenets
of ”survival of the ﬁttest” under (recurrent) competition. Economists usually
read ”competition” as ”perfect competition” (or ”price-taking” behavior), which
implicitly requires a large (”almost” inﬁnite) population. In more general terms,
however, competition means a contest or ﬁght between several claimants, who
aim to ”beat” each other. Evolutionary behavior precisely corresponds to this
second meaning and is therefore highly relevant for contest theory. Yet, if only
ﬁnitely many contestants compete recurrently, e.g. lobbyists whenever elections
or law-making initiatives come up, then Alchian’s argument is shown to lead
to a maximization postulate, which is diﬀerent from the one embodied in Nash
equilibrium, namely, relative payoﬀ maximization. Leininger (2003) shows that
for the class of contest success functions axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) these
two maximization postulates cannot determine the same solution; i.e. evolutionary
equilibrium and Nash equilibrium always diﬀer. Moreover, he relates behavior
in evolutionary equilibrium of a contest to behavior in Nash equilibrium in a
transformed zero-sum game, which can be interpreted as a transfer contest game.
His paper, however, is completely silent on the issue of existence of both types of3
equilibria, in particular ESS, in these games. For a class of games with aggregative
payoﬀ structure Possajennikov (2003) adapts the notion of ”price-taking” behavior
in large player populations to ﬁnite populations just as Schaﬀer (1988) adapted
ESS from large populations to ﬁnite populations and relates his new notion of
”aggregate-taking equilibrium” to Schaﬀer’s notion of ESS. He shows that these
two solution concepts can determine the same solutions.
The present paper considers the special, but important class of contests introduced
by Tullock (1980) and determines behavior in evolutionary equilibrium by explicitly
providing a proof of existence and uniqueness of ESS for these games. It then
relates the unique ESS to the unique Nash equilibrium. The diﬀerence is larger the
smaller the number of contestants. Prominent and important examples of contests
between just two contestants are provided by litigation lawsuits. Hirshleifer and
Osborne (2001) model trials as contests with the help of a ”litigation success
function” of the Tullock type considered here. Baye et al. (2001) model litigation
systems as (ﬁrst-price) all-pay auctions, which form a limiting case of the family
of Tullock contest success functions. In both of these models litigants inﬂuence
the merit of their cases – and hence their winning probabilities – by hiring skillful
attorneys and other inputs. Leaving aside the agency problem between litigant
and attorney and supposing equal access to legal services – as these authors do
– portrays typical litigation trials as recurrent games played through attorneys
suﬃciently often to warrant an evolutionary approach. This approach is extended
to contests over public goods by Leininger (2002), who proves existence of a local
evolutionarily stable strategy, which does coincide with Nash equilibrium if and
only if competing groups (with at least two members) are of the same size.
Section 2 recollects Tullock’s analysis of eﬃcient rent-seeking1, in which he intro-
duced an important class of contest success functions. Section 3 motivates our new
solution concept and shows that eﬃcient rent-seeking is not evolutionarily stable.
Section 4 proves existence of an evolutionarily stable strategy and discusses its prop-
erties. Most remarkably, an overdissipation result can be proven. Section 5 shows
that the type of ”spiteful” behavior, which drives the results obtained in the pre-
vious section, is extremely robust, which motivates a short inquiry into its general
relationship to Nash equilibrium behavior in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
1Following Tullock (1980) and the subsequent literature we refer to Nash equilibrium behavior
in a rent-seeking contest as ”eﬃcient” rent-seeking, although it is not eﬃcient in the usual economic
sense of the word.4
2. Eﬃcient rent-seeking
Recall that Tullock (1980) proposed a model, in which n rent-seekers compete for a
rent of size V . If the contestants expend x = (x1,...,xn),xi ≥ 0, the probability of
success for player i,i = 1,...,n is given by
pi(x1,...,xn) =
xr
i Pn
j=1 xr
j
and expected proﬁt for player i is given by
Πi(x1,...,xn) = pi(x1,...,xn) · V − xi =
xr
i Pn
j=1 xr
j
· V − xi.
One can show that for r ≤ n
n−1 a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists
in this game, in which each player maximizes expected payoﬀ by bidding
x
∗ =
n − 1
n2 · r · V.
Aggregate rent-dissipation then amounts to
n · x
∗ =
n − 1
n
· r · V.
Equilibrium expenditures never exceed V , the value of the rent, but may be strictly
less than V . The ”full rent dissipation”-hypothesis does not hold; yet overdissipation
is incompatible with individually rational payoﬀ maximization as it would imply,
that at least one contestant has a negative payoﬀ in equilibrium (and would therefore
be better oﬀ by non-participation or bidding zero).
Important variations of this basic model include Corcoran and Karels (1985),
Higgins et al. (1987), Hillman and Samet (1987), Leininger (1993), Leininger and
Yang (1994) and Baye et al. (1994), in which the analysis is extended to mixed
strategies and extensive form, dynamic games. Most recently, Baye and Hoppe
(2002) have shown that a Tullock contest of this type is strategically equivalent to
innovation tournaments in the form of patent races.
3. Evolutionarily stable strategies
An alternative to the rational-expectations approach of the previous section is to
resort to a more biologically inspired view of human behavior; namely that economic5
behavior diﬀuses, stabilizes, mutates and disappears along an evolutionary path
that leads to the survival of best or best adapted strategies or standards of behavior.
A particularly useful concept in this respect is the notion of an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS) as deﬁned by Maynard Smith (Maynard Smith and Price (1973),
Maynard Smith (1974, 1982)), because it allows one to say something about the
stable dynamic properties of an evolutionary system without the need to commit
oneself to speciﬁc dynamics. We follow Schaﬀer (1988), who adapted the ESS
notion to ﬁnite populations of interacting agents.
A strategy is evolutionarily stable, if a whole population using that strategy cannot
be invaded by a suﬃciently small group of ”mutants” using another strategy. Simi-
larly, a standard of behavior in an economic contest is evolutionarily stable, if – upon
being adopted by all participants in the contest – no small subgroup of individuals
using a diﬀerent standard of behavior can invade and ”take over”. Obviously, in the
context of ﬁnite populations the smallest meaningful number of mutants is one. The
emphasis of the evolutionary approach is not on explaining actions (as a result of
particular choice or otherwise), but on the diﬀusion of forms of behavior in groups
(as a result of learning, imitation, reproduction or otherwise).
The deﬁnition of invadability is all important:
Deﬁnition 1:
i) Let a strategy (standard of behavior) x be adapted by all players i,i = 1,...,n.
A mutant strategy ¯ x 6= x can invade x, if the payoﬀ for a single player using ¯ x
(against x of the (n − 1) other players) is strictly higher than the payoﬀ of a
player using x (against (n−2) other players using x and the mutant using ¯ x).
ii) A strategy xESS is evolutionarily stable, if it cannot be invaded by any other
strategy.
Roughly speaking, an ESS is such that, if almost all members of a group adopt
it, there is no other strategy that could give a higher relative payoﬀ, if used by
a group member. The dynamic justiﬁcation for this notion of equilibrium is, that
more successful strategies diﬀuse or ”reproduce” faster than less successful ones
and ultimately extinguish the latter. One obvious source of such dynamics behind
ﬁnite population ESS is imitative behavior on behalf of contestants. In real-life
rent-seeking this may occur in situations in which contestants do not perfectly
know each other’s payoﬀ functions and hence resort to simply comparing expected
payoﬀs by averaging over several contests, which they observe.6
We now formalize ESS in the context of Tullock’s contests and search for an eﬀort
or expenditure level x which qualiﬁes as an ESS.
Denote by x the expenditure proﬁle (x1,...,xn) = (x,...,x);x can be invaded, if
there exists x1 = ¯ x , say, such that
Π1(¯ x,x,...,x) > Πi(¯ x,x,...,x) for i = 2,...,n.
Consequently, a strategy xESS is an ESS if and only if
Π1(¯ x,x
ESS,...,x
ESS) < Πi(¯ x,x
ESS,...,x
ESS)
for i = 2,...,n and for all ¯ x 6= x
ESS.
This is equivalent (see Schaﬀer, 1988) to demanding that xESS must maximize the
relative payoﬀ function
Π1(¯ x,x
ESS,...,x
ESS) − Πi(¯ x,x
ESS,...,x
ESS)
of player 1 with i ∈ {2,...,n}. Our ﬁrst result states that the unique Nash equilib-
rium strategy x∗ does not do so:
Theorem 1: The unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of a Tullock contest for
r ≤ n
n−1 is not evolutionarily stable.
Proof: We claim that x∗ = n−1
n2 · r · V – the Nash standard of behavior – is not an
ESS!
We prove this by showing that x∗ does not locally maximize the relative payoﬀ
function of player 1:
Π1(¯ x,x
∗,...,x
∗) − Πi(¯ x,x
∗,...,x
∗) =
¯ xr − x∗r
¯ xr + (n − 1) · x∗r · V − (¯ x − x
∗)
Clearly, ∂Π1
∂¯ x = 0 at ¯ x = x∗ since x∗ is a Nash equilibrium strategy for player
1; however,
∂Πi
∂¯ x
=
−x∗r · r · ¯ xr−1
(¯ xr + (n − 1)x∗r)2 · V < 0 for i = 2,...,n
since a marginal increase in ¯ x decreases an opponent’s probability of winning.
Consequently, a marginal increase of ¯ x from x∗ to x∗ + 4 has a second-order
negative eﬀect on i’s own payoﬀ and a ﬁrst-order negative eﬀect on an oppo-
nent’s payoﬀ. Therefore i’s relative payoﬀ increases, if expenditures rise above
the Nash level x∗. q.e.d.7
The proof shows that more aggressive behavior than shown by a (rational) Nash-
strategist does better in relative terms! The more aggressive mutant does – of
course – not better in absolute terms, because he does not play a best response
(that would be x∗). This ”loss” in absolute terms is more than oﬀset by a gain in
relative terms, he now has the advantage of the highest payoﬀ realized among all the
contestants, because his higher aggressiveness lowers the opponents payoﬀs by more
than it lowers his own! This kind of behavior has been called ”spiteful” (Hamilton,
1971) in the sense that an ESS-strategist pursues not only a larger payoﬀ for himself
but also a lower payoﬀ for his competitors. Consequently, in a stable group of all
ESS-strategists and no mutants an ESS-strategist is not in general maximizing his
payoﬀ or ﬁtness, but the diﬀerence between his own payoﬀ and the average payoﬀ
of the other players (Schaﬀer, 1988).
Relative considerations are undoubtedly important in a contestant’s calculus. The
contest success function of the Tullock model is homogeneous of degree zero; i.e.
pi(λx1,λx2,...,λxn) = pi(x1,...,xn) for all i = 1,...,n, and thus only depends
on the relative size of bids: e.g. set λ = 1
x1 to get pi = p(1, x2
x1,..., xn
x1). Axiomatic
characterisations of contest success functions (e.g. Kooreman and Schoonbeek, 1997)
precisely use zero-homogeneity as an axiom to account for the importance of relative
concerns in contests. E.g. Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001), who use these functions
as ’litigation success functions’ in their model of trials, observe that ”in lawsuits
relative success depends on two main factors: the true degree of fault and the eﬀorts
invested on each side” (p. 131, our italics). The latter serve primarily to be able to
present a relatively better case, they may explicitly include expenditures that serve
to weaken the opponent’s case.
It therefore makes sense to explore the implications of evolutionary equilibrium,
which can be thought of as guiding behavior of contestants, who not only care
about relative eﬀorts but also about relative success.
4. Evolutionary rent-seeking
We now show existence of an ESS for Tullock contests and discuss its properties.
Theorem 2: There exists a unique ESS of a Tullock contest for r ≤ n
n−1. It is given
by
x
ESS = (
r
n
· V,
r
n
· V,...,
r
n
· V ).
Proof: Let ¯ x denote the mutant strategy and x denote the candidate strategy for
an ESS.8
Consider the maximization problem
max¯ x
¯ xr − xr
¯ xr + (n − 1) · xr · V − ¯ x + x
whose ﬁrst-order condition reduces (in a straightforward manner) to
(FOC)
n(¯ x · x)r
(¯ xr + (n − 1) · xr)2 · ¯ x
· r · V = 1
Furthermore, since ESS requires identical behavior of contestants, we set ¯ x = x
in search of a symmetric solution. This gives
n · x
2r · r · V = n
2 · x
2r+1
which is solved by x = r
n · V . This is our only interior solution candidate.
The second-order condition for a local maximum becomes – upon diﬀerentiat-
ing FOC –
[r · ¯ x2r · xr + r · ¯ xrx2r · n − r · ¯ xr · x2r − 2r · ¯ x2r · xr
¯ x2[¯ xr + (n − 1)xr]3
+
−¯ x2r · xr − ¯ xr · x2r · n + ¯ xrx2r] · r · V · n
¯ x2[¯ xr + (n − 1)xr]3 < 0.
Simpliﬁcation leads to
¯ xr · xr[(r − 1)(n − 1)xr − ¯ xr(r + 1)] · r · V · n
¯ x2[¯ xr + (n − 1)xr]3 < 0 ; (SOC)
this holds in the symmetric solution ¯ x = x = r·V
n , if
(r − 1)(n − 1)(
r · V
n
)
r − (
r · V
n
)
r(r + 1) < 0
or, equivalently, r · n − 2r − n < 0. Thus, the second-order condition for local
maximization holds for
r <
n
n − 2
.
Also note that (SOC) implies global concavity of the relative payoﬀ function,
if r ≤ 1 holds: The bracketed term in the numerator is always negative, the
one in the denominator always positive. Hence, the local optimum is a global
one for all r ≤ 1. If r > 1, then (SOC) shows that the relative payoﬀ function
is locally convex for suﬃciently small x: substituting
x =
r · V
n9
into (SOC) yields
¯ xr

r·V
n
r h
(r − 1)(n − 1)

r·V
n
r
− ¯ xr(r + 1)
i
· r · V · n
¯ x2
h
¯ xr +

r·V
n
r
· n −

r·V
n
ri3 .
This expression is positive for all 0 < ¯ x < ˆ x and negative for all ¯ x > ˆ x, where
ˆ x solves the equation
(r − 1)(n − 1)
r · V
n
r
− ¯ x
r(r + 1) = 0
i.e.
ˆ x =
 
r − 1
r + 1
· (n − 1)
r · V
n
r!1
r
=
r − 1
r + 1
 1
r
· (n − 1)
1
r ·
r · V
n
.
As a consequence, the relative payoﬀ function is convex on (0, ˆ x) and concave
on (ˆ x,∞). Moreover, we have
ˆ x <
r · V
n
= x
ESS
if and only if
r − 1
r + 1
 1
r
· (n − 1)
1
r < 1.
The latter is equivalent to r < n
n−2. Hence, in this range the only candidates
for a global maximum of the relative payoﬀ function are 0 and r·V
n .
Obviously, Π1(x,x,...,x) − Πi(x,x,...,x) = 0
whereas Π1(0,x,...,x) − Πi(0,x,...,x) =
n(r−1)−r
n(n−1) · V .
The latter is less or equal to zero, if r ≤ n
n−1.
This completes the proof that xESS is indeed an ESS as n
n−1 < n
n−2. Finally
note, that the corner solution x = (0,...,0) is obviously not an ESS as it can
be invaded by any x ∈ (0,V ).
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 says that a unique evolutionary equilibrium exists under precisely those
conditions, which imply existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Combined with Theorem 1 this means that the two equilibrium concepts always
yield diﬀerent predictions of behavior for this class of Tullock contests.
The following properties of evolutionary equilibrium are now immediate:10
Theorem 3:
i) Individual expenditures and aggregate rent-dissipation in the unique evolu-
tionary equilibrium x = ( r
n ·V,..., r
n ·V ) are always higher than in the unique
eﬃcient (Nash) equilibrium x∗ = (n−1
n2 · r · V,..., n−1
n2 · r · V ).
ii) Aggregate rent-dissipation in the unique evolutionary equilibrium is indepen-
dent from the number of contestants, it is solely determined by the rent-seeking
technology (contest success function) and the value of the rent:
n ·
r
n
· V = r · V
iii) For r > 1 there is overdissipation of the rent in the unique evolutionary equi-
librium; for r = 1 there is full dissipation of the rent and for r < 1 there is
underdissipation of the rent.
The occurence of overdissipation of the rent in a pure strategy ESS is the conse-
quence of spiteful behavior in the presence of increasing returns to expenditures
(r > 1). Evolutionary stability, or alternatively behavior driven by relative payoﬀ
maximization, necessitates spite and spite fuelled by increasing returns to expen-
ditures leads to overdissipation of the contested prize. This – partly – vindicates
Tullock’s ”overdissipation postulate”, a target of much (justiﬁed) criticism, in the
conﬁnes of his very own model (for a discussion of the overdissipation debate see
Baye et al. (1999), who discuss overdissipation as a possible ex post feature of mixed
strategy equilibria in the all-pay auction, which results from the Tullock family of
contests, if r → ∞).
Note that for n = 2 and r = 2, the limiting case of our existence result in Theorem
2, rent dissipation is twice the amount of the rent as each contestant spends up to
the value of the rent! Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001, p. 174) argue that in judicial
systems, in which ”judges were to limit themselves to procedural issues and refrain
from instructing juries on the substantive merits of the case”, contest expenditures
(e.g. for ’star’ attorneys) may well exhibit increasing returns; i.e. trials are then con-
tests with r > 1. Our ﬁndings are then in line with the often observed and lamented
fact, that litigants spend too much compared to what is at stake in litigation cases.
An interesting property of Tullock contests is that allowing for several entrants at a
time does not aﬀect the expenditure level in an ESS. This strong stability property
is shown in the next section.11
5. Global stability
The deﬁnition of an ESS given above demands stability of behavior against precisely
one mutant. A generalized ESS (Schaﬀer 1988) also accounts for the possibility of
the occurence of several identical mutants:
Deﬁnition 2:
i) A strategy xESS is evolutionarily M-stable, if a population of n players using
it cannot be invaded by m identical mutants all using any other strategy ¯ x for
1 ≤ m ≤ M and M ≤ n − 1.
ii) A strategy, that is (n − 1)-stable, is called globally stable2.
We now claim that an ESS of a Tullock contest, whose existence is assured by
Theorem 2, is always globally stable. This gives further strength to the properties
of an ESS described in Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 (Global stability):
Let r ≤ n
n−1, then it holds that the unique ESS is globally stable.
Proof : We use induction over the number of mutants m ≤ n − 1. Obviously,
Theorem 2 provides an induction start for our candidate x = r
n · V as it is 1-
stable. Suppose then, that x = r
nV is m-stable; i.e. if Πm
M denotes the relative
payoﬀ function of one of m mutants, then our induction hypothesis means,
that
(IH) Π
m
M =
¯ xr − ( r
nV )r
m · ¯ xr + (n − m)( r
nV )r ·V −(¯ x−
r
n
V ) < 0 for all ¯ x 6=
r
n
V.
We now claim, that x = r
nV is in fact (m + 1)-stable; i.e. our claim is
(C) Π
m+1
M =
¯ xr − ( r
nV )r
(m + 1)¯ xr + (n − m − 1)( r
nV )r·V −(¯ x−
r
n
V ) < 0 for all ¯ x 6=
r
n
V.
Rewrite (C) as
2If a strategy x is M-stable, but not (M +1)-stable for M < n−2, then M is called the ’degree
of stability’ of x (Schaﬀer 1988).12
 
¯ xr − ( r
nV )r
(m + 1)¯ xr + (n − m − 1)( r
nV )r · V −
¯ xr − ( r
nV )r
m¯ xr + (n − m)( r
nV )r · V
!
+
 
¯ xr − ( r
nV )r
m¯ xr + (n − m)( r
nV )r · V − (¯ x −
r
n
V )
!
Then it follows from (IH), that the term in the second bracket is negative for
all ¯ x 6= r
nV . It hence remains to be shown that the term in the ﬁrst bracket is
also negative for all x 6= r
nV .
If ¯ x < (>) r
nV , then the denominator of the ﬁrst term is smaller (larger) than
the one of the second term, while the common numerator is negative (positive).
In both cases it follows, that the diﬀerence must be negative and hence (C)
must hold. This completes the proof.
A more heuristic argument sheds further light on the somewhat unintuitive property,
that in a Tullock contest 1-stability implies (N − 1)-stability: consider again the
relative payoﬀ function of one out of m mutants, if the other contestants in the
invaded population use xESS = r
n · V ,
Π
m
M =
¯ xr − ( r
nV )r
[m · ¯ xr + (n − m)( r
nV )r]
· V − (¯ x −
r
n
V ) ;
and note that m only exerts inﬂuence on the probability of winning the contest and
not expenditures. We now show that this inﬂuence is always a negative one. For
this we treat m as a continuous variable and compute
∂Πm
M
∂m
=
−(¯ xr − ( r
nV )r)(¯ xr − ( r
nV )r)
[m · ¯ xr + (n − m)( r
nV )r]2 · V = −
"
¯ xr − ( r
nV )r
m · ¯ xr + (n − m)( r
nV )r
#2
· V.
This expression is negative whenever ¯ x 6= r
n ·V and zero otherwise. Hence it follows,
that any strategy that cannot invade xESS with a single carrier (i.e. Π1
M < 0) cannot
do so, if it replicates. The eﬀect of an additional ’clone’ of a by itself unsuccessful
strategy, which replaces an ESS-strategist in the contest, works to the disadvantage
of the mutants by unambiguously reducing the diﬀerence in winning probabilities
between them and ESS-strategists. Stability against ’small’ invasions is synonymous
with stability against any invasion (by identical mutants).
6. Evolutionary versus Nash equilibrium
The stability result of section 5 adds to the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence between
behavior in evolutionary and Nash equilibrium. The diﬀerence is a consequence of13
considering a ﬁnite population of contestants: according to Deﬁnition 1 any single
mutant will never meet another mutant, whereas every ESS-strategist will always
meet exactly one mutant. This changes the nature of the evolutionary stability
argument: it now pays to reduce one’s own success, if that reduces the other
strategy’s success even more. In contrast, such spiteful behavior cannot survive in
an inﬁnite population, since there is always a large number of matchings involving
ESS-strategies exclusively. The following construction is due to Schaﬀer (1988) and
shows – translated into our context – how spiteful behavior becomes less and less
rewarding with an increasing number of ﬁnitely many contestants. The framework
takes account of a full range of diﬀerent contest scenarios, its polar cases correspond
to the ”playing-the-ﬁeld” scenario of section 4 and the inﬁnite population scenario
originally proposed by Maynard Smith, respectively.
Consider a group of N potential contestants, who may recurrently engage in a contest
of size n < N; i.e. only n out of N contestants compete in the contest (so far we
have considered the case n = N, in which each contestant ”plays the ﬁeld”). The
expected payoﬀ of a single mutant among the N contestants if he is drawn into a
contest and plays a strategy ¯ x against (n-1) other players using strategy x is then
still given by
Π1(¯ x,x,...,x) =
¯ xr
(n − 1)xr + ¯ xr · V − ¯ x ;
but one of the other (n-1) players i,i ∈ {2,...,n}, chosen for the contest expects
Πi =

1 −
n − 1
N − 1

· Πi(x,...,x) +
n − 1
N − 1
· Πi(¯ x,x,...,x)
as the probability, that a chosen player i will face the mutant player 1 from the
remaining (N-1) potential players among the further chosen (n-1) players is n−1
N−1.
Note, that we have assumed that players are chosen for participation randomly and
with equal probability.
Consequently, an ESS strategy xESS must now solve the problem (Schaﬀer 1988) of
relative payoﬀ maximization
maxx Π1(x,x
ESS,...,x
ESS) −

1 −
n − 1
N − 1

· Πi(x
ESS,...,x
ESS)
−
n − 1
N − 1
· Π1(x,x
ESS,...,x
ESS)
Eliminating the constant term

1 − n−1
N−1

· Πi(xESS,...,xESS) equivalently yields
maxx Π1(x,x
ESS,...,x
ESS) −
n − 1
N − 1
· Π1(x,x
ESS,...,x
ESS)14
Again, if xESS solves the above problem, then x∗ = (xESS,...,xESS) cannot be
invaded by any strategy x 6= xESS. We can directly read oﬀ from the maximand,
that as N → ∞ we approach the Nash equilibrium problem and hence the diﬀerence
in behavior among n contestants in Nash equilibrium and among n contestants
(chosen out of a large population of potential contestants) in evolutionary equilib-
rium disappears.
In fact, it is not diﬃcult to show, that for any n out of N contestants an ESS of a
Tullock contest exists; hence we record
Theorem 5: Assume r ≤ n
n−1 and let N be the number of potential contestants,
who are drawn into a Tullock contest of size n, n ≤ N. Then the unique ESS
is given by
x
ESS =
(n − 1)N
(N − 1)n2 · r · V .
This expression specializes to xESS = r
nV , if n = N, and approaches x∗ = n−1
n2 rV ,
the Nash equilibrium eﬀort, if N approaches inﬁnity. Also note, that aggregate
expenditures are
(n−1)N
(N−1)n ·rV , so the overdissipation result still holds for r suﬃciently
close to n
n−1: if r = n
n−1, then n · x∗ = N
N−1 · V > V .
The framework of this section ﬁts the case of litigation lawsuits fought by attorneys
well. Plaintiﬀ and defendant each choose a lawyer from a pool of authorized lawyers,
who then engage in the contest.
7. Conclusion
We have examined behavior in Tullock’s classic rent-seeking contest from the point
of view of evolutionary stability in ﬁnite populations, our ﬁndings have bearings for
contest theory in general.
Evolutionarily stable behavior in Tullock contests leads to higher eﬀorts of contes-
tants than Nash behavior and may entail overdissipation of the contested ”rent”
or stakes. Contestants behave as if they aim to maximize relative payoﬀ, a goal
which is not only furthered by increasing one’s own payoﬀ, but also by lowering the
payoﬀ of others. This additional motive justiﬁes additional, ”spiteful” investments
into the contest. Moreover, spiteful behavior in an ESS is a very robust property;
i.e. it is stable against any number of identical deviants. Finally, we have shown15
that Nash equilibrium behavior in Tullock contests results from evolutionary equi-
librium behavior of an inﬁnite population, which engages in contests with ﬁnitely
many participants.
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